The question on anyones mind, after realizing that the flight recorders took two years and 50 MUSD to find – in this case the ones from the ill-fated Air France AF447 over the South Atlantic – why data is not easier available, has now a chance to be answered. Two high-tech companies will by 2020 be able to offer the airline industry data-transmitting black boxes. That this has not happened before is strange, to say the least. The technology has been available for ages, like for most of everything else. Today ambition and fantasy are the narrow sectors. A lot of advantages can be expected for airline operations, but the major thing is of course for accident investigators to immediately be able to study all data. Had this been around when it should have, The Malaysian MH370 mystery would have been no mystery. Remains to be seen how keen pilots will be to be more openly recorded than before, when the boxes were examined only after a crash. Most likely access to the data will be restricted in a way that satisfies everyone.
US aerospace companies Honeywell and Curtiss-Wright are creating cockpit voice and flight data recorders that will be capable of transmitting aircraft data to ground stations.
The data will stream off the aircraft to satellites and then to Honeywell’s data centers.

Other small news: A Virgin Airlines Boeing 787-9 on route LAX-LHR managed to benefit from a mega-jetstream clocking a record groundspeed of 801 mph or 1289 km/h, cutting almost an hour off the total flight time, (and actually beating the speed of sound over ground without the ”bang”. Did everyone get that?).

Other big news. Airbus is packing up its effort to best the Boeing B747 Queen of the Sky with its Fat Mammy A380, since nobody is buying much anymore. The biggest customer has been Emirates, who has almost half of the approx. 250 produced. In all fairness it must be stated that passengers have loved flying the A380, partly because of spaciousness and smooth silent flights, but possibly also enjoying exquisite service provided by the up-scale airlines who initially bought it.

When a low-cost carrier (LCC) announces a huge savings program – to stay in business -there is room for some concern. To be a LCC, most corners have already been cut. Any further savings can be done – in the best of worlds – without affecting flight safety. Trimming the organization, fleet changes, route changes and what not.                          Cost-cutting that does affect flight safety (has been done industry-wide – and has proven in some cases catastrophic) can be listed in four categories. Absurd duty times (read fatigue), sloppy aircraft maintenance, insufficient fuel reserves and inadequate pilot training. With authorities being traditionally lenient when it comes to enforcing stricter regulations, there is room for airlines to continue savings.                                                  And room for more concern.

Since go-arounds cost time and money, landings are so much better. So much better that a LCC (Low Cost Carrier) Norwegian 737 ignored go-around instructions from Helsinki tower – twice – and landed anyway on Friday afternoon the 18th of January. The reason for the tower to order the crew to go around was a Turkish 737 not completely vacated, but calls went unheeded. An investigation is started into the occurrence. There was no real danger to any of the aircraft.

Other news; the voice recorder of the ill-fated LCC Lion Air 737 thet crashed shortly after take-off has been found. The recorded data seems to be of good quality and transcription should be completed in a few days, but it may take months before the data is analysed together with the data from the flight recorder previously found, in order to give full account of what led up to the accident.

Some have claimed that Boeing suddenly had a safety issue, when they in fact had introduced a safety feature, giving automatic nose-down inputs in case of an impending stall. Boeing has claimed – and until full clarity is available – rightly so, that existing procedures for a stabilizer run-away should suffice, should the system get erroneous inputs, provided the pilots had sufficient training. There is so far no real reason to think the complete analysis will contradict this, especially since the crew on the previous flight managed to cope with a situation supposedly identical. Training is expensive and is one of the cost savers directly affecting flight safety. Time will show if some extra training could have saved the day. On many other fatal accidents we know it most probably would have.

(The feature Boeing added to the MAX version of the 737, because of stronger, heavier engines and a slightly different longitudinal balance, was a signal to the stabilizer to bring the nose down when a too high nose-up attitude might cause a stall. A faulty angle-of-attack indicator might give the same signal to the stabilizer during normal flight, causing a runaway stabilizer that is handled by a non-normal procedure including a power cut-off by switches easily available. The stabilizer can the be adjusted manually.)

Just revealed (no really hot news, since it happened last year) is the fact that a Norwegian B787 bound for Buenos Aires from Gatwick airport, London, managed to start its take-off 417 meter further down the runway from the proper take-off point on a 2.560 meter long runway. Analysis shows a 12 ton overweight for that particular remaining runway length (2.143 m) and the conclusion that an aborted takeoff in case of an engine failure at the most critical moment (known as V1) would have sent it careening into whatever geography lies beyond that runway end. 270 people onboard.

There is no safer way to travel any given distance than by air. Under following circumstances: You fly with a renowned airline with a longstanding uncompromising safety culture; with a well maintained aircraft (doesn’t have to be brand new) with adequate fuel reserves, in an area with good air traffic control, between to major airports with modern (read long enough) runways and all-weather navigational aids -and with well-trained cockpit- and cabin crew that have duty times not causing fatigue.

The safety culture of the airline will basically cover all of the above. In these circumstances weather is no factor. As strange as it may sound, when blizzards approach you don’t take a bike ride, media advices you not to drive your car, busses are cancelled, ships stay in the harbor, trains have trees block their tracks – and planes still fly.

When something goes wrong, like an air disaster, things surface during ensuing investigations into all areas of what could have contributed to the accident. The follow up of low-cost carrier Lion Air’s crash recently has some disturbing ingredients, possibly shared by any airline needing to cut costs.

Lion Air’s latest crisis illustrates the challenge relatively new carriers face as they try to keep pace with unstoppable demand for air travel in developing nations while striving for standards that mature markets took decades to reach. Interviews with dozens of Lion Air’s management personnel and flight and ground crew members, as well as Indonesian investigators and airline analysts, paint a picture of a carrier so obsessed with growth that it has failed to build a proper safety culture.

”What I saw was a company, from the top down, that made saving money a motto – so spend the minimum on pilot training, salaries, management, everything,” said one former safety manager. Members of its flight and maintenance crews, speaking on the condition of anonymity to avoid losing their jobs, say they were pressured to keep double logs in order to hide overwork and inattention to safety. Pilots said they resorted to using methamphetamine to survive the grueling hours. ”As long as the priority is getting airplanes in the sky rather than safety, then you’re going to have problems,” said a former government investigator.

The last two paragraphs are quotes from a more extensive report on the accident. The contrast to what is mentioned in the first paragraph should raise an eyebrow with even the most enthusiastic I-got-my-ticket-for-almost-nothing-passenger. In Europe, Asia, America and basically all over the world the threat of too much cost-cutting is for anyone to judge. No real reason to scare anyone since nothing newer happens, with a very few exemptions.

The first paragraph may be used as a guideline should anyone so desire.

Aircraft are – although surprisingly seldom considering their technical intricacy – affected by technical malfunctions, called snags, which are entered in the aircraft logbook. They are sometimes referred to as A,B and C faults. Some (A) require immediate remedy, if they are serious enough, like a cracked windshield or a deflated tyre. The authorities allows the airlines 3-10 days to fix other (B and C) snags in order for them to be able to allocate maintenance recourses sensibly.

The latest fatal accident hit Lion Air hard and brought attention to maintenance issues. In all fairness, Lion Airs creativity in adhering to these regulations are shared by a number of low-cost airlines, basically because they have to, in order to stay low-cost. A faulty radar, that for some strange reason was categorized C in stead of A, was on a Lion Air aircraft, after 10 days, moved to another aircraft, for another 10 day respite. A cash starved 747 operator moved, after 10 days, a faulty reverser from engine number 1 (the outer engine on the left/port wing) to the number 2 engine for another 10 days, and so on for the two remaining engines on the right/starboard wing, and could thus wait 40 days without spending money on repair. The authorities would have been a little bit thrilled, had they learned about such creativity.

In all fairness – again – prestigious airlines might be affected by similar urge to save money, especially when run by managements with limited understanding of fundamental safety requirements, but fueled with ambition to maximize profits. They sometimes promote one clever person from the pilots corps to flight operations manager, but he/she does seldom want to jeopardize their prestigious position by telling management they run things badly.

One such airline, run by a cost-conscious rather than technically oriented management lost two aircraft a few years apart, fortunately without loss of life. In the first case an auto-throttle system, left un-repaired for three days, was a contributing factor to the accident. In the other case mechanics, put under a rationality squeeze, had six month prior to the accident claimed that something was bound to happen, simply because they didn’t have enough time to do what they had to do. Any and all savings was of course wiped out by the two hull losses, although properly ensured. So will all savings be, once they contribute to an accident, which they will, if exaggerated unwittingly.

Any captain can of course put his/her foot down and demand immediate repair, should conditions so require in his/her opinion – if normally employed and backed by a pilots union. A luxury not normally available in a low-cost airline.

 

In Canada, where some years ago a 16 hour pilot duty time was considered safe, things have changed. Fatigue-related accidents and incidents has awakened authorities, who now announce that this particular hazard has to be a thing of the past. Although a 8 hour working day will remain a wet dream (for crew members), things have improved slightly. Within 2 to 4 years the new regulations will be implemented. As follows:

1200 duty hours per year will be reduced to 1000. 120 hours in any 30 consecutive days will be changed to 112 hours in any consecutive 28 days. 13 and 3/4 hour flight duty will be 9-13 hours depending on start time of day/ sectors flown (whatever that means).            A rest period of 8 hours in the bunk will be increased to 12 hours at home or 10 hours away from home.

Some slight changes in off duty time and night shifts per week might bring some, but limited, comfort, but all i all the comforting contribution to flight safety is the ambition – albeit not the result – by the authorities, to improve things. Now, since the authorities around the world are manned by people interested in flying but not qualified to fly planes – and thus not really interested in listening to what pilots have to say – things doesn’t get any better that this. And this is good compared to what airlines  outside Canada get away with.

If things are repeated in this blog it is simply because they have to be. Fatigue is a killer. Consequently the law (written by authority people) says in no uncertain terms: You may not fly under the influence of fatigue. That is a good law. It might have worked in the era before the dawn of low-cost airlines. Since most low-cost airlines do not allow pilots to be organized in unions – and often have pilots employed from manning companies, where you get paid for hours flown, and have zil job security, not being backed by a union, should you elect to follow the law and cancel a flight halfway to your destination, because you have experienced heavy delays and now fatigue is filling your forehead with pain – the sky will be filled with people to tired to talk to keep awake. Things might improve after a few more fatigue-related accidents.

There is a slight focus on cockpit crew here. It is just as bad for cabin crew. Contrary to popular belief they are not on bord to serve wet towels. They have ultimate responsibility in assisting passengers in case of any emergency. Too tired to think straight might severely hamper that ability.

If you read this – and is not a crew member – you might be surprised. Manning is a cost to managements. If you have to cut corners – which you have to, in order to reduce the price of a ticket to less than is necessary to pay for a totally safe operation, increasing duty hours (and reduce training) is the thing. As always, the only real truth (repeated) for a passenger is: you get what you pay for.

In the aftermath of a tragedy it is unavoidable – and necessary – to take a closer look at the industry from all angles. The questions and answers regarding the low-cost carriers crash in the Java sea lately will eventually be straightened out, since what the industry does best is to find out, to the extent possible, no resources saved, what went wrong. Then actions are taken to rectify all factors contributing to the accident, to make sure it never happens again. One major reason for todays extremely high level of flight safety is that almost everything possible has happened – and been rectified. So far so good.

What has not happened is still to come, and there are threats ahead, mainly because issues that needs rectifying are not receiving funds, because why worry, and spend money, when things are going so great. Almost always. Below please find a list of a few dangers, brought on by the economic plight the airline industry has endured, since someone made people believe that you can fly for peanuts in billion-dollar aircraft, without any change in the overall condition of things;

• extended duty-times, causing fatigue – contributing factor in some fatal accidents.
• reduced – and outsourced – maintenance, increasing risk for non-airworthy aircraft.
• banning of pilots unions, giving total control over flight safety to economically oriented managements.
• reduced fuel reserves, causing emergencies and at least one fatal accident.
• reduced pilot training, causing several fatal accidents.

among other things….

On the issue of pilot unions, there is a previous article in this blog.

The four other issues could be instantly reduced to less important factors, should authorities decide to change all parameters one or two step towards more safety – across the board, i.e. airlines not following stricter rules wouldn’t even get fuel. Cost-driven competition in those areas would cease to exist. (Utopia is sometimes fun to ponder.)

Fatigue has been discussed in previous articles, as has pilot training.

On the matter on maintenance a few things have to be mentioned. One airline after another made decades ago rid of mechanics on destinations in a cost-cutting effort, followed later by a (PFI) preflight inspection performed by one of the pilots also at departure station, making the technical status of the aircraft evaluated by a pilot with limited mech understanding, in lieu of a mechanic with years of training. One consequence emerged immediately, where a technical remark, that would possibly ground the aircraft on the destination, could repair not been made, was saved for entry in the aircraft log on the homebound flight, especially by a Captain not backed by a pilot union.

Further, many airlines have started outsourcing aircraft maintenance to low-cost countries. They might not loose quality, but they definitely loose some control, much like when you employ pilots from the internet instead of having your pilot corps – and mechanics corps – close.  Not to forego any investigations, it is still possible to state that Southwests compressor failure, causing the first US fatality in years, would most likely not have happened, had a more thorough inspection of the engine been performed, a check that has now been ordered on all similar engines. (After the accident.)

Further still, maintenance departments reduced in manpower and recourses are constantly strained when needed badly. The Lion Air aircraft, that crashed shortly after take-off, had experienced problems on the previous flight. Again, not to forego any investigation results, there is no pilot today who has not seen a logbook entry being signed of by a mechanic with ”Checked on ground without remarks”. What Captain will not accept taking off with that assurance.

Coming articles will address fuel reserves, more on pilot training, and also the flight safety issues in Asia, where CRM (Crew Resource Management) has a hard time surviving ancient cultural norms, as mentioned in some scary detail in Olle Sjöberg’s comments.

 

 

 

 

There is so far nothing to suggest that the low-cost airline that crashed last week had inadequately trained pilots. However, Boeing has in a bulletin told operators to address ”existing flight crew procedures” in case there is a problem with the AOA (Angle of attack) indicator. Lion Air is said to have had problems during flights preceeding the fatal one, among other things with speed indications. What can be said in general, until facts are presented, is that todays automation has changed pilot training into more of system operation than old-time hands on flying, often called stick-and-rudder time.

Things change in cycles, and so does the views on what the pilots need to know and handle. With the introduction of Airbus on the scene decades ago, with a whole new level of automation, pilot were suggested to not touch anything. The thought was that most accidents were caused by pilot failures and consequently an almost fully automatic aircraft would solve that problem. Things didn’t work out that way to everyones grief, and pilots had to be brought back into the picture to some extent.

Now, pilot training is really expensive. Not only are they not producing revenue while sitting in a flight simulator. The simulator itself is no cheap gadget. In todays strained economy – again brought on by low-cost competition – training is reduced to a minimum, with the outspoken ambition by managements not to affect flight safety. Unfortunately it sometimes does, especially when conditions deteriorate unexpectedly, and in situations never anticipated by people in the construction workshop.

The debate has gone back and forth regarding the need for pilots to be able to hand-fly -without any help from automation – in any flight conditions. Old-timers support that idea strongly, basically because they know how. What has emerged over time is a sort of compromise where old-time skills, acquired in countless hours of simulator training, has evaporated in favor of less expensive auto-flight training, which can basically be taught/learned by a few CD-discs and a good computer. The belief that this does not affect flight safety has unfortunately proven fatal several times lately.

The most spectacular/strange accident happened i San Fransisco some years ago, when Asiana, one of Asias major low-cost airlines, did not make it all the way to the runway. Experienced pilots, faultless Boeing 777 and beautiful weather. The instrument landing system (ILS) on ground was switched off att the time, and having no radio beam to hook up the autopilot on, and none of the pilots familiar with manual flying, they hit the seawall short of the runway, destroyed the giant aircraft in a ground loop and eventually caught fire. By a miracle just a couple of people were killed. Other more fatal accidents lately, with low-cost airlines mainly from Asia, have been attributed to inadequate pilot training. In all fairness, the not at all low-cost Air France had to boost their own pilot training after the ill-fated AF447 over the South Atlantic some five years ago.

Saving money unwisely affect everyone. There will most likely be more on pilot training in coming articles.

Worried about the latest airline disaster, involving a Boeing 737. No need to worry about that particular aircraft. The B737 is one of the safest aircraft ever. At anyone time more than 2000 B737 are in the air. Every two seconds one B737 is taking off somewhere in the world. The aircraft involved in Mondays accident was furthermore brand new. Should one worry, it would be reasonable to concentrate on the older models, such as the 39 year old plane that in May went up and then down outside Havanna, Cuba, killing 112 passengers. Since the spectacular loss of a section of the roof on a flight between two Hawaiian islands decades ago, regulations regarding maintenance has been boosted, included metal fatigue inspections. What is reasonable to worry about, is wether or not the particular airline one is planning to fly with, is complying with all those regulations, or if they are economically pressed to lower costs wherever they can, a concern among some officials regarding the airline involved in the Cuba crash.

Such concerns are common. In the US, the FAA has a list of airlines/countries not judged to meet certain criteria. It can be found at: http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/iasa/media/IASAWS.xlsx                                                              In Europe authorities has banned 114 airlines from 15 countries. Check out: ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/safety/air-ban_en                                                                      More interesting reading can be found at the commercial website Airlineratings.com.

The airline, Lion Air, is a low-cost airline, with a pre-crash seven star rating (max possible) with Airlineratings.com. It has now dropped to six stars. There is no need to immediately try to blame the accident on the fact that the operator is a low-cost airline, unless there was a technical malfunction from a previous flight that was not properly corrected. Lion Air, together with all other Indonesian airlines have been cleared from the European black list, after showing safety standard improvement. The reason for the accident will with utmost certainty be revealed, once the flight and voice recorders are retrieved from the comparatively shallow seabed. More on this later.